THE RATE-MAKING PROCESS IN PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE-GOALS, TECHNICS,
AND LIMITS
C. A. KuLp*
The general title of this symposium is Regulation of Insurance, but it is no accident that most of the papers deal with one aspect or another of insurance rates and
their regulation. So central indeed is the rate to the concept of insurance or riskpooling that an adequate treatment of insurance regulation cannot avoid it. It is the
special purpose of this paper to present an analysis of the objectives of the actuary or
rate-maker; of the technics he devises; and of the handicaps, technical, social and
other, he must surmount or ignore to achieve these objectives. We seem constantly to
forget it, but it is no more fair to judge the rate-maker's product without reference
to his goals than that of any other craftsman or professional, and unless his limits as
well as his objectives are kept plainly in the foreground he will often be criticized
for failing to do the impossible, or even the unnecessary and undesirable. It is not
possible nor desirable to carry this emphasis on technical, vis-a-vis legal principles
beyond a certain point, but as far as is practicable the approach in this paper will
be in terms of the former. Insurance is a technic or a principle before it is a business,
and it is a business before it is a legal institution. The present paper will center on
the principles on which both business and institution rest and without which neither
would be possible.
I
NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE INsURANCE RATE

The premium or rate is the price charged for insurance.

(There are technical

differences between them, but for the present purpose the two will be used interchangeably.) The rate has essentially only two functions. It should produce total
funds sufficient to cover the insurer's obligation; it should distribute the cost of insurance fairly among insured persons. We expect today that a rate will meet both
tests, but the first is clearly the more important. The essential requirement of iisurance is that it be sure; actuarially this means that on the average the rate must
be sufficient to meet losses and insurer expenses of administration. Historically this
is also by far the older function, and naturally so, because a scheme designed to pool
risks and increase the margin of certainty in human affairs that cannot be counted
on to pay off at ioo per cent is hardly better than no insurance at all. The first
obligation of the insurer is to keep solvent.
But there are reasons for this primacy of rate adequacy even more intimately con*B.S. 19,7 Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; A.M. 1921, Ph.D. 1924, University of
Pennsylvania.
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nected with the business, as distinct from the science of insurance. A rate that errs
on the redundant side is naturally the first objective of the insurance pioneer, when
costs still are unknown and when insurance would hardly be available at all were it
not for the willingness of the enterpriser himself to take considerable risk. Generally
speaking, the newer the insurance and the fewer the number of individual risks
insured, the greater the emphasis on rate adequacy. The special case of the life
insurance rate is discussed below.
The second major requirement of a sound rate-that it share insurance costs
fairly among those insured-has been a much later technical development. Rates
designed to be fair as well as adequate had to wait for the development of credible
experience and indeed of the science or art of the actuary itself; making a fair rate
is technically a far more complicated process than making one that is simply adequate. Competition, it is sometimes said, may work in the direction of fair rates,
but the force of competition, to say the least, is slow and its direction uncertain, and
it has as often as not produced rates neither fair nor adequate.
Sometimes rates are required to meet additional tests, but on examination these
are discovered either to be sub-tests to those we have been discussing or to be of
very minor importance. A rate or rate structure, for example, should be, it is said,
reasonably responsive; that is, it should not be so out of date that it represents risk
conditions no longer in effect. Since (see below) all rates with one exception are
prospective in character-rates based on the past are, applied in the future-the ratemaker must always be alert to the possibility that his rate under today's conditions
is too high or too low. But this is only another way of saying that the rate no
longer represents a fair allocation of cost among insured risks and is therefore inequitable. A sound rate or rate structure should also be stable. For technical, apart
from all other, reasons, a rate that jumps erratically from period to period (particularly, as in casualty insurance, where the typical period of coverage is one year
and rates are revised annually) is unsound and undesirable. An unstable rate is
evidence either that the basic rate data lack credibility or actuarial reliability or that
the rate-maker is incompetent or both. In either event the adequacy of the rate is
also in jeopardy.
Finally, a rate may be expected to encourage the reduction of loss. Sound insurance principle requires, however, that this objective be kept clearly secondary to
those of equity and adequacy. Insurance after all is a device to pool risk and share
losses. To the extent that the insurer can soundly and fairly combine provision of
safety incentives with this fundamental purpose of insurance, very good. But the
condition definitely limits the role of the rate as a safety incentive. When safety
is made the main end of the rate structure, this end, as in workmen's compensation
schedule rating, may indeed be achieved but at the price of so great a failure in rate
equity that (with rare exceptions) it has had to be abandoned. On the other hand,
if the safety objective is kept subordinate to these other objectives, the effectiveness
of the safety incentive is greatly restricted. This is because the amounts of reward
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and penalty that can fairly and safely be offered the insured will not be large enough
to influence his attitude toward his risk.
The statutory standards for acceptable insurance rates broadly parallel the technical requirements we have been discussing. Quite commonly the statutory statement
of the first standard is that the rate must be adequate but that it must not be unreasonable, that is, unreasonably high for the risks to which it applies. There is an
upper as well as a lower limit to adequacy.1 The equity standard is commonly
expressed in language such as the following:
No rate shall discriminate unfairly between risks involving essentially the same hazards
and expense elements or between risks in the application of like charges and credits.
The first statute in this country to regulate insurance rates, the Kansas fire rate
law of 19o9, included both anti-discrimination and adequacy-reasonableness standards. The great majority of early rate laws, including the New York law of 1911,
however, included anti-discrimination standards only In passing it is interesting
to note that insurers perceived the advantages of adequate fire rates much earlier
than did the state legislatures. The latter indeed had been attempting for years
through anti-compact laws applied to insurance, to assure that rates, as a result of
insurer combination and monopoly, would not be too high.
This discussion of rate standards would not be complete without a word on the
reasons for restricting the subject of this paper to insurances other than life. The
fact is that the making of life insurance rates, as distinct from other features of the
life insurance business, is not regulated directly at all, and when it is regulated in-

directly, as through reserve standards, the rates are regulated with reference to their
adequacy only. It has sometimes been surmised that one reason for this exemption
is the superiority of life insurance loss and exposure data as measures of insurance
cost. But this explains why life insurance rates can be made with relative confidence
of their adequacy rather than why it has not been necessary for the state to assure
that they are so made. The history of assessment life insurance suggests that there
must be other and stronger reasons for the exemption of the life actuary from rate
regulation. More to the point is the preference of technician, insured person, and
legislature for a rate exceedingly simple, even crude; one that ignores for the great
mass of insured persons all criteria of risk except that of age. All things equal,
the cruder the rate structure the sounder, and for a risk as long in term as that of
life and with so much of weal and woe hanging on the expectation that the contract
will some day be honored in full, a precisely equitable rate is far less important than
an adequate rate. This same preference for adequacy is illustrated in the immense
popularity of the participating life contract, the rate for which includes a loading
intended to provide a margin for policyholder dividends but which in the meantime
raises the rate well above that of non-participating contracts. It is hardly a qualifica'N. Y. INS. LAw §183(c).
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tion on this point either to note that the redundancies and crudities of the life
participating premium may later be corrected through dividend schedules that may
attempt a more precise allocation of cost among insured classes. These dividend
schedules are not subject to state regulation except as to their application, and
while they give the opportunity for further rate refinement, neither law nor public
demand assure that they do so. State regulation of life insurance reserves, it should
be noted, is an important indirect control on the adequacy of the life rate structure,
and all the more because the rationale of life reserve statutes is that the insurer at
all times must estimate, and protect, his outstanding liabilities prospectively. But
life reserves, however carefully established, provide guarantees of adequacy only,
none of equity.
II
KINDS OF INSURANCE RATES

Insurance rates may be classified from several points of view. One of the most
fundamental is on the basis of what may be called the insured unit, that is, broadly
stated, whether the rate is computed as a broad average for all risks that have
approximately the same loss-producing characteristics or separately for the individual
risk. (By individual risk the actuary means the combined exposures of a single
insured.) Stated more precisely, since insurance rates even for the individual risk
must be made by application of the law of averages, the distinction is one based on
the extent to which the rate paid by the individual insured is affected by experience
other than his own. It is a little difficult to find names for either of these rates. It
may come as a surprise to the non-specialist, accustomed to regarding insurance
as one of the exact sciences, but the terminology of insurance is the very reverse of
standard, descriptive, and orderly. The same technical term, schedule rate, for
example, is used in different insurances with quite different meanings; other terms,
group, for example, have both a variety of technical meanings as well as a general
one. In the analysis that follows careful distinction needs to be made, therefore,
between the concepts that underlie rate-making technics and the various names that
may be given to their local and special application.
Rates for the very great majority of risks in all lines are made, and in the nature
of the case must be made, not for the individual risk but as averages for the members of a group of risks with essentially the same loss-producing characteristics.
Manual rates in workmen's compensation and automobile insurance; fire insurance
class and blanket rates; rates on the individual in life and disability insurance, are
examples. Likewise, schedule rates in fire insurance, which result from the application to large and complex individual risks, of schedules of debits and credits reflecting
the good and bad features of the risk. The rate here is applied,it is true, by examination of the individual risk, but it is clear that the function of the schedule-to identify, classify, and rate identically all individual risks having similar construction, ex-
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posure, and occupancy characteristics-is to produce a rate based not on the actuarial

characteristics of the individual risk but on what might be called its family characteristics. Other examples of this kind of rate, despite surface dissimilarities, are
the much simpler schedules used in burglary and glass insurance. Even though
the term group has been applied in life and disability insurance in rating the individual risk, the kind of rate we have been discussing is most accurately described as
a group rate.
The essential reason that most risks must be rated on the basis of broad group
averages is that alone each risk is so small that its individual experience lacks the
credibility or actuarial reliability essential to a sound rate structure, hence the combination in classes of risks with broadly the same loss-producing characteristics. To
the extent that the individual risk is large enough to develop credible experience of
its own, both good business practice and equity require that the risk be freed from
multi-risk averages and put on its own. The criterion of risk size is the number of
exposure units: number of workers or dollars of payroll in workmen's compensation;
number of workers in group accident and health; number of automobiles in automobile fleet, and so on. As exposure units increase in number for the individual
risk, the rate-maker finds theoretically and empirically that he can put more and
more weight on its experience, less and less on the family averages. In this kind
of rate-making the actuary does not of course ignore averages; what he does, as
individual risk credibility rises and falls, is shift the relative weights of the group
experience and of the individual risk. In workmen's compensation prospective experience rating for example, even of those relatively few risks that meet the minimum requirements of eligibility, the great majority are not completely eligible. To
the extent that the individual risk cannot establish ioo per cent credibility for its
experience, to that extent does the rate-maker have to combine with individual experience the experience of the group to which it belongs. Even if the risk qualifies
for self-rating-is so large that group experience is ignored entirely-the system remains one of averages. This essential tie between group and individual risk experience is shown also by the fact that in workmen's compensation prospective experience rating the individual risk rate is computed as a debit or credit on the
manual or group rate, never as an independent calculation. Another evidence of
this use of the group averages as controls is that no prospective rating plan is considered sound that does not produce as many dollars of premium over the average
as below: the reduction in total premium for better-than-average risks must equal,
but no more than equal, the increase in total premium for poorer-than-average.
Retrospective experience rates, it is true, are calculated with no direct reference to the
manual or group rate, but this exception is apparent rather than real since the result
of the rate-making process here is essentially a variety of self-rating, and is sound only
to the extent that the individual risk establishes its own experience credibility
Examples of individual risk rates are prospective experience rating in workmen's
'For an explanation in greater detail, see C. A. Kt.LP, CASUALTY INSURANCE 574-576 (rev. ed.
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compensation, automobile, and liability insurance; schedule rating in workmen's
compensation insurance; 5 and in part retrospective experience rating now applied
in workmen's compensation, automobile, and general liability insurance. Individual risk rate plans have had wide development in casualty insurance, where in
recognition of their equity objective, they are often referred to as merit rates. They
have not been applied, except very crudely and partially, in fire insurance at all.
To trace all the reasons that account for this difference between fire and casualty
insurance would require space out of proportion to the importance of the subject in
this paper. A few general indications will suffice. The most important reason, perhaps, is the superiority of the actuarial materials available to the casualty, and particularly workmen's compensation and liability, rate-maker, which at one and the
same time reveal to him, and to the insured, the inequities of the manual rate in the
individual case and a way to correct them. The compensation-liability rate-maker,
for example, unlike the fire, has relatively objective units of exposure, no problem
of under-insurance. Casualty lines also represent for the average insured a much
higher proportion of personal or business expenses; casualty costs show much wider
variation than fire from year to year and between the best and the poorest members
of a classification (for example, large and small compensation risks); and individual
casualty risks are much more often large enough to give individual risk experience
a high degree of credibility and to suggest, in combination with the other characteristics we have listed, the possibility and the desirability of self-insurance, always a
potent influence on the attitude of the rate-maker. The casualty insured takes a close
interest in his rates; the actuary must also. Finally, the art or science of casualty
rate-making, like casualty insurance itself, is a recent development. From the beginning the casualty actuary has worked in a business and social atmosphere in which
it was taken for granted that he would use the most precise actuarial tools available,
that the insured (and the beneficiary) has a stake in the rate-making method at
least as vital as that of the insurer, and that the equity of a rate is at least as important as its adequacy. In this connection it is revealing to note that despite
hundreds of years of fire insurer precedence, the profession of fire actuary is still to
appear. The casualty actuary dates from the opening of the second decade of this
century.
III
RATE-MAKING TECHNICS

A. Loss Ratio
What I have been discussing up to this point are the kinds of rate that result as
the end-product of the rate-making process. More important for the present purpose
is consideration of the method, technic, or philosophy the rate-maker applies in
'Workmen's compensation schedule rating is properly classified as individual risk rather than group.
While debits and credits are assigned after an engineering inspection of the loss-producing characteristics
of the individual risk, the process is applied only to those few members of the classification eligible, and
the resulting net debit or credit is applied to the average or manual rate for the classification.
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producing this end-product. Again there are essentially only two approaches: the
rate may be the result of applying the loss ratio method, the pure premium method,
or a combination of the two. As the discussion that follows will show, what sometimes is referred to as a third approach-that of judgment-is more accurately described as a subfactor entering necessarily and in various degree into the two basic
technics.
The older of the rate-making technics is the loss ratio: the new rate or average
rate level for multi-groups is determined by comparison of actual with expected or
permitted loss costs and an adjustment upward or downward of the old rate to bring
the new rate in line with the most recent experience. This is the method traditional
in property insurance including fire, marine, burglary, glass, and power plant; it
continues, without the justification in property insurance lines, as the principal
technic in commercial accident and health insurance. It will be illustrated by a
simplified analysis of the method of making glass rates used by the National Bureau
of Casualty Underwriters.
The glass rate (like any other) is made of two main elements: that part intended to cover losses, or pure premium; that part intended to cover expenses. At
the time of the last pre-World War II examination of this rate structure by the New
York Insurance Department0 the per cent of total premium set aside for losses, or the
expected loss ratio, was 423; the ratio for administrative expense and profit was .577.
For the calendar years 1934-1938 the actual loss ratio-the proportion of premiums
written for the 5-year period used to pay losses as distinct from administrative expenses-for the state of New York was .362. That is, other things equal, the general
rate level charged under the rates in force would appear to be too high to pay losses
expected by the difference between .423 and .362 or by approximately 15 per cent.
All other things equal, therefore, a reduction of 15 per cent in the state-wide glass
insurance rate level is indicated. But as this revision illustrates, other things are
usually not equal, and a 15 per cent reduction is justified only if the probabilities
are strong that the experience of the 5-year period past will be exactly reproduced
in the period for which the new rate is calculated. If, for example, there have been
rate reductions downward during the experience period, actual loss ratio figures
unless adjusted will understate the true loss level because the same number of insured units of glass exposure will produce a lower total of premiums than is shown
in the historical data, though, other things equal, they will produce the same number
of dollars of glass loss. Because there was such a reduction, the actual loss ratio in
this revision was adjusted to .395, which produced an indicated rate level reduction
of 7 per cent. The role of the judgment factor in making rates by the loss ratio
technic is illustrated by the fact that no attempt was made in this revision to take into
' At that time, the name of the organization was National Bureau of Casualty and Surety Underwriters. A pre-war example has been selected because the report of the only examination since that
time, of July 1, 1947, covers principally the war years when normal actuarial procedures and controls,
particularly for smaller premium volume lines, had to be sharply curtailed.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

account the effect on losses of policy liberalizations effective with this same revision,
or of other minor changes which might be expected to raise the actual loss ratio.
The reduction in the state-wide rate level approved by the New York Insurance
Department was approximately 6 per cent. 7
The influence of the judgment factor on this kind of rate-making is shown also
in the action of the New York Department in the 1947 fire insurance revision, which
against a permitted loss ratio of 475 approved a general rate increase of 8 per cent
instead of the indicated 4 per cent increase because of an upward trend in building
costs. Another example is the policy of the New York Department not to approve
rate revisions unless the indicated change is more than 2/2 per cent up or down nor
to approve revisions of more than 25 per cent.8
This brief exhibit suggests the advantages and limitations, the strengths and
weaknesses, the inherent as well as some of the acquired characteristics of the loss
ratio technic. It is first*and foremost an exceedingly simple approach, as simple
as the simplest arithmetic. It is in fact not a method of making rates at all but a way
of revising rates from time to time with an eye principally to assurance of an adequate over-all rate level. The essence of a fair rate structure however is an equitable
system of classified risks; in this respect the loss ratio technic is very defective because
it provides only a most indirect and uncertain guide for deciding whether a given
individual risk belongs in this classification family or that.
The test of risk homogeneity is whether over an appropriate period the members
of a family of risks are likely to develop-reasonably-like loss experience. One
way of deciding this is to look at the risks-the fire rate-maker calls this inspectionand by the application of a mixture of experience, acumen, and instinct called underwriting judgment, estimate their loss potentialities. This way is used most widely,
and most justifiably, in marine insurance where objective materials for making
rates are least available and where every risk more or less is unlike every other.
Another way is to compute for each risk or each group of risks a pure premium
expressed as so many dollars of loss cost per unit of exposure, for example, per
hundred dollars of workmen's compensation payroll, per automobile, per thousand
dollars of burglary protection. The advantage of the pure premium approach is
twofold: underwriting results are expressed directly in terms of units of exposure
and not, as in the loss ratio, of dollars of premium; there are no limits except those
of practicability to the degree of refinement with which loss and exposure data can
be manipulated, and thus to the extent to which the actuary may push his search
for homogeneity. At each revision he calculates a brand-new rate from the ground
up; with the loss ratio technic he adjusts an old rate which itself is assumed to have
been equitable. Under the pure premium technic the actuary can make any number
of combinations he wishes of his data; he can, and does, combine, divide, and revise
SINSURANCE DEPARTmENT, STrTE OF NEW YoRx, II REPORT ON EXAMINATION OF NATIONAL BUREAU
OF CASUALTY AND SURETY UNDERWMTERS 209-2XI (194!).
" WALTER F. MAR-TNEAU, THE REVxsioN OF FIRE INSURANCE RATES 15, 20, 25 (address given before
Rating Personnel at Richmond, Va., September, 1947).
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his classifications as experience indicates. He will of course end up with rates for
risk classifications, but in the meantime he is much less apt to be averaging the dissimilar. Since the most reliable test of homogeneity is similarity of loss experience,
this approach to rate-making, even though the majority of individual risks develop
no credible experience of their own, is the most nearly ideal. It does not, as we shall
see, suit all kinds of insurance, but where it can be applied there is no question of its
technical superiority. Unlike the loss ratio method it gives the rate-maker a relatively precise tool that he can use to achieve a rate not only adequate in general
level but equitable among risks and risk groups.
The loss ratio technic operates on the assumption that risk homogeneity- is
established when on the average the combined risks in each classification require the
same proportion of total premiums to pay losses. Now while it is obvious that this
may show equity of insurance cost allocation between classifications, the technic
offers the rate-maker slight opportunity to determine whether the individual members have been put in the proper classification in the first place. Modern standards
of rate equity require equity among classification members as well as between members of different classifications. He could, were he so minded, push his analysis of
experience further and further back until he reaches the individual risk, and in principle the further the rate-maker pushes his analysis of loss ratio figures the nearer
his results could be made to approximate those of the pure premium technic. In:
fact, the loss ratio rate-maker is not interested in precise actuarial-statistical analysis,
and indeed is often openly suspicious of it. The reasons are various. He does not
of course admit that he is not as eager for rate equity as the pure premium actuary.
His argument is partly that the rate-making problem in his lines makes the pure
premium method inapplicable; partly that his rates in the long run are just as
equitable, and more often adequate. There is in fact something to be said for this
argument. Take first the technical reasons. In general the rate-maker deals with
lines in which the exposure unit is very defective, for example, dollars of insurance
value in fire and burglary insurance. Sometimes as in glass and burglary insurance
he is handicapped by small volumes of exposure, often exaggerated by a multiplicity of loss causes that further dilute the credibility of the experience. Sometimes
as in fire, power plant, and some burglary lines, loss frequency is low, which has
additional repercussion on the reliability of the averages.
It would be naive indeed to conclude however that the only reasons for the
failure to make use of, or at least to experiment with, pure premium rates are technical. The reasons at least as often are traditional. The position of the fire companies
on two much milder suggestions for improving the fire rate structure will illustrate.
For years the New York Insurance Department has been urging, not the abandonment of the loss ratio approach, but two proposals designed to assure greater equity
of fire insurance rates derived by the loss ratio method. One of these is adoption of
a more orderly and more precise system of classifying experience and one bearing a
closer relationship to the fire rates charged. Following enactment of a new rating
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law in New York, successive Superintendents since 1934 have repeated that "a review
of fire insurance rating systems reveals two weaknesses: lack of proper statistical
information and rating methods unsupported by statistical experience."" The industry has been reluctant to accept either the facts alleged or the recommendations.
The reader may judge for himself to what extent the argument of the opposition
is technical or traditional-emotional. The extreme wing of the opposition goes so
far as to call fire rates made on classification experience "....

a major threat to an

procedure."1

orderly and equitable rating
The argument in part is that since fire
"hazard is potential as well as active" (loss figures do not accurately measure fire
risk), fire rates made on classified experience would not be equitable. "Classified
statistics simply have no vitally important part in rating . ..[In fire schedules]

individual charges are empirical-arbitrary-but they are uniform and relative and,
fairly applied, do establish relative fire hazard." Equity, that is, means equity of rate
application, not equity built into the rate structure itself. However incorrect any
individual charge or credit, the entire system of charges and credits is equitable
because all risks are treated alike for the same characteristics.
.The major role of judgment in this kind of rate-making is evident. But even
were it possible to use loss and exposure data on a classified basis, the last author
would still avoid it because of his fears of rate inadequacy. "There is no assurance
whatever that the experience of next year will even approximate the same pattern [as
that of the past]. After all, it is our business to measure the likelihood of future losses
-not to pay for last year's business." This amounts to arguing that rates made on
classified experience-"a plan to gather yesterday's gardenias"--are rates made by
clockwork, without benefit of judgment, of trend analysis, of data adjustment of any
kind. It is also even stronger proof that judgment is the principal ingredient in the
fire rate structure. Despite really remarkable advances in fire construction and fire
fighting in the last 5o years, the shadow of Mrs. O'Leary's cow seems actually to grow
longer rather than shorter.
There are however signs of progress. As a result of the collaboration of the
New York Department, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and
the Insurance Executives Association, a revised and improved classification system
was finally adopted in 1947 and is now in use. It is much too early to judge its results, but ex-Superintendent Dineen expects from the expanded list of 115 classifications "a more equitable apportionment of rates among all classes. Certainly the
increased number of classes should lead to better grouping and prevent the old system
of lumping together classes of risks which had little or nothing in common."1 1 For
the first time premiums will be reported on the earned as well as the written basis,
and losses incurred as well as paid, an advance toward improvement of rate-making
at least as important as that of the new classification plan itself.
OpY. dt. supr note 3, at 17.
"0Eugene F. Gallagher, "Fire Insurance Rating Problems," address, Ohio State University, April 3o,
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The second official recommendation for improving the equity of fire rates is that
the rate level for all classes should be required to meet a uniform expected or permitted loss ratio standard. The enormous difference in attitude toward rate-making
between fire and casualty insurance is nowhere better illustrated than by the fact
that a uniform permitted loss ratio has been standard practice for the latter from
its beginning, and that in the former the issue is now being bitterly debated and is
not yet settled :12
The use of a formula . . .has been consistently opposed by the fire insurance business.
The reason most commonly advanced is that the fire insurance business in the past has
operated on broad general averages and that high loss ratios on some classes and low loss
ratios on others are to be expected.
It is not to be expected of course that every year every classification will in fact
produce precisely its expected loss ratio; the reference in the quotation is to a policy
of expected loss ratio differentials deliberately set by the companies:13
I am referring to those classes which as a result of business policy consistently produce
high profit ratios while others produce low profit ratios or even losses.
A by-product of this policy deplored by the Department as another variety of
inequity is the practice, when general rate level revisions are made, of applying
horizontal increases or decreases without reference to the disparities, often considerable, in loss ratios between classifications. It requires no lengthy analysis to arrive
at the conclusion of the Superintendent of New York that "Unless a [uniform permitted loss ratio] formula is used on a class-by-class basis there is no way that we
know to obey the requirement of the law that equity shall be done between classes."' 4
The New York Department reports even that "from time to time we have encountered the anomaly of having rating organizations resist increases which were
warranted on the figures and at the same time oppose reductions when they were
required.""'
Actual fire loss ratios for Pennsylvania for 1942-1946 illustrate the inequities
that may result from an unregulated insurer policy of differential permitted loss
ratios.'6
PER CENT LossEs PAID OF PREMIUMS WRITTEN

All
Classes
Frame protected ............. 33.2

Highest Cost
Class

Class With
Lowest Cost LargestPremium
Class
Volume

125.7

29.1

82.7

14.2
13.1
10.3

301.5

7.2

17-0

Brick protected ............... 45.2

84.4

Brick and frame protected .....
35.0

Fireproof ................... 39.5

36.6
28.9

For the five years ending with and including 1948 the Pennsylvania state-wide
fire loss ratio on the written-paid basis was reported as .3975. Insurance Commis2
1d. at 3E.
2,Ibid.

8
'5

1l'id.
M

MARTINEAU,

"' MIDDLE DEPARTE NT AssOCIA rOIN OF FTRE UNDERwTERs

op. cit. supra note 8, at 13.

(unpublished manuscript).
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sioner Malone, in announcing his approval of revised rates effective October I, 1949,
emphasized the point that, although the over-all result of the revision was a 7 per
cent average decrease, the rate changes ranged from increases of 25 per cent to decreases of 20. (The permitted loss ratio in Pennsylvania is 45 per cent.) That the
Pennsylvania Department believes that the loss ratio technic should be used more
7
effectively toward rate equity is shown by Malone's statement that:1
We have reached the place where each class of business should pay its own way and not
be carried by other profitable classes. In other words, home owners should not, and will
not in the future be compelled to carry the load for the more hazardous risks.
The insurers may reply that class equity is more than a matter of comparative
loss ratios, and they are right. It is true, for example, (see page 519) that some classes,
residence for example, incur more administrative expense than others, and thus show
a smaller profit than the loss ratio data suggest. Since the loss ratio method assumes
a uniform relation of insurer administrative expense to loss costs, this amounts to
saying that one kind of inequity, incalculable and uncontrolled, tends to cancel
another. The loss ratio rate-maker indeed is no better prepared with precise data
on expense differences by class than of loss differences. The method does not preclude detailed analysis of insurer adminstrative expense, but it is a fundamental
assumption of the method that such analysis is not needed. Until it is forthcoming,
however, loss ratio rate-making permits inequities in both loss and expense allocation.
Analysis of the loss ratio method has proceeded to this point without detailed
reference to another feature that is often associated with it in a rate structure, the
fire rate schedule. As we have seen, the loss ratio method is best suited to, and is
primarily used, for assuring adequacy of rate level. This means that a given rating
plan, fire schedule for example, may combine the simplicity of the loss ratio principle with methods of risk classification the very reverse of simple. These rate
schedules have advantages and limitations of their own and will therefore be considered separately.
The principal criticisms aimed at the fire rate schedules used in the eastern part
of the United States are that they are too complex; they are too cumbersome; their
application is too expensive; their end-product is not an equitable distribution of loss
costs among insured risks. On the first point "... all the experts in our [New York]
Department believe that it is possible to work out simpler methods in which the
loss experience should be given more weight.""8 There may be, there are, important factors inherent in the underwriting situation that explain some of the complexity and cumbersomeness of these fire schedules; what the New York Department
is saying is that the factors do not amount to a caveat in perpetuity against analysis
and experiment. The same Department in reporting on its examination of the New
York Fire Rating Organization concluded on this point that:"
"I Statement by James F. Malone, Jr., announcing approval of 1949 rate revision, quoted Weekly
Underwriter, September 17, 1949, p. 643, August 6, 1949, p. 29!.
18
9 PiNK, op. di. supra note 3, at x.

t INSOEANCE DEPARTENT, STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON EXAMINATION OF TnE NEW YoRK FiRE

RATING ORGAMZATION

121

(1946).
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Having got into the elaborate system of schedule rating the fire insurance rating organizations have found it extremely difficult to make changes and adjustments to keep in line
with actual experience. The general attitude has been to retain the complicated schedule
rating systems with estimates of numerous elements of hazard the costs of which are
unknown. The rating organization is opposed to change....
A major collateral defect is that they fail grievously in attempting or producing
rate equity :N
[Schedule] rate changes that have been made have largely been the result of pressure
and agitation from various groups and associations of assureds, agents or companies.
Some of the changes were the result of pressure to meet competition of other insurers.
Other rate adjustments, long overdue, were not made until requested by the Insurance
Department.
Another form of inequity lies in the application of the schedules, in "rating
practices arising out of competitive situations... ."" There is no way of measuring
this, but the extent of inequity arising through inappropriate use of the schedules
is probably as great as that arising from the defects of the schedules themselves.
The obstacles to a more rational and equitable fire schedule considered solely as
a method of risk classification are, as we suggested earlier, very real. On risks
exposed to many and complex loss-producing factors and developing as low a loss
frequency as fire, average rates in the sense of the pure premium method are probably not possible. The fire insurance business is on sound ground when it argues
that it has a difficult rate-making job; it is vulnerable though when it accepts its
handicaps as permanent and, far from attacking them boldly, erects them into insurance dogma. Time and time again the New York Department has urged the
fire insurers to look more carefully into the technics used by their casualty colleagues.
To this, and to more specific recommendations for improvement of the schedules,
response to date has been slight. The hopeful side of the situation is that not all
the obstacles, perhaps not the greatest obstacles, are technical, and traditional barriers, given the will and time, can be broken down or surmounted. We need time
to adjust for the fact that:22
For many years the fire insurance companies had operated without state supervision of
the rate-making process ....
Many of the rate-regulatory officials ...did not appreciate
the importance of classified experience for rate-making purposes.
Already the New York Department sees "less emphasis on bargaining and more
on objective analysis of the experience."2'3 The Insurance Executives Association, a
group of top stock fire officials, is working experimentally on a revised fire rate structure that combines the judgment basis of rating the loss-producing features of the
complex individual risk with a uniform expected loss ratio for setting the rate level.
It may be years before even this relatively mild reform wins approval by industry
and supervisory officials, but the fact of willingness to experiment in making fire
"

PINK:, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1S.

22 Ibid.

1

' MARTINEAU,
2

3Ibid.

op. cit. stipra note 8, at 14.
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rates is something new in the fire insurance world. Application of the pure premi.
um technic in upstate New York to low-value homogeneous fire classes is another
indication of a gradually changing company attitude toward the fire rate problem.
An imponderable of incalculable influence that may be counted to work toward more
scientific fire rates is the infiltration of the fire companies, particularly as a result of
expanding company underwriting powers under the new multiple line laws, by
statisticians and actuaries trained in the casualty tradition.
B. Pure Premium
The central characteristics, and some of the advantages and limitations of the
pure premium technic have been suggested, by contrast at least, in preceding pages.
A brief analysis of its application by the National Council on Compensation Insurance in making workmen's compensation rates for Virginia will supply a more
specific demonstration.24
The rate-maker using the pure premium technic sometimes determines his classification relativities first, sometimes the rate level; the choice is one of technical
convenience. In the rate revision of our example, that of manual rates effective
1949-5o, he chose to set the rate level first, that is, to make his best estimate of aggregate compensation costs for all Virginia insured employers for the period of rate
application-one year beginning July i, 1949. No single step in any rate-making
formula illustrates so clearly not only the use of large amounts of judgment but the
need for and the possibilities of statistical-actuarial technics as controls on such
judgment. In setting the rate level, the compensation actuary has problems peculiar
not only to insurance, fire as well as casualty, for which the price must be set well
in advance of the date of sale and delivery of the product, but to teiliability lines
where insurer liability is not only deferred but indefinite. He must, to begin with,
determine rate level between 6 to 9 months before the first day on which the rates
will be applied and as much as 21 months before the last policy runs out at the rate
level chosen. This would still be a comparatively simple matter, but in the spring
of 1949, when the new rate structure was created, he had also to reckon with the
fact that the latest years for which he had available even fairly mature experience
were policy years 1945-1946. (Policy year experience is that for all policies written
in the calendar year of the same number, that is, the last policy in policy year 1946
will run out December 31, 1947.) To use even this experience is of course not
practicable without testing it statistically in every way possible. These tests, for
example, are required to determine the relation between initial reports of and fully
developed loss figures for the purpose of adjusting the former (this results from the
deferred nature of the compensation insurance obligation), and to determine trends
(both in the experience period and for the year of rate application) in order to
"National Council on Compensation Insurance, Memorandum re Rate-Making Procedure as
Applied to the Determination of Virginia Manual Rates, April 6, 1949, and related memoranda and
other materials.
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apply correction factors to pure premiums to bring them up or down to the new
cost level. In this revision the rate level selected was one approximately 7 per cent
below that of the rates in force for the year ending June 30, 1949.
But the rate structure must not only be adequate, it must also fairly represent
differences in insurance cost among employers. The most important basis of employer grouping in workmen's compensation is the classification, which may represent all employers whose workers are exposed to the same industrial process, like
blast furnace operators; or (a cruder average) in the same industry or business, as
watch manufacturing; or employing workers in the same occupation, for example,
clerical employees and chauffeurs. The Virginia 1949 filing comprised 475 classifications.
For each of these classifications the actuary computed a pure premium from
adjusted 1945-1946 policy year losses and payroll data-dollars of compensation losses
per $Ioo of payroll. Consistent with the standards the compensation actuary sets
himself, loss figures were put on the incurred, vis-a-vis the paid, basis, a refinement
absolutely essential not only for rate equity but for rate adequacy, since the typical
compensation claim is paid in installments, often months and years after the claim
is incurred, and to keep his accounts on the cash income-disbursement basis would
be to invite bankruptcy. By the same token, premiums were put. on the earned, not
the written, basis. Ideally each classification would have a payroll exposure large
enough to produce results ioo per cent credible or actuarially reliable. Within a
single state, however, few classifications can be expected to show perfect credibility.
The pure premiums of the majority cannot be taken at face value. The rate-maker
has in this situation two alternatives. The older, and now practically passe, is to
combine multi-state experience for the same classification, on the assumption that
the advantages of broadened payroll exposure will more than counter-balance the
admitted disadvantages that follow when (however competently executed) adjustments are made to take account of loss-causing factors affecting the same industrial
classification differently in different states.
The other and more recent approach to this problem, taken over from automobile
insurance rate-making, is to apply to the pure premiums developed for each Virginia classification a table of experience credibility. To the extent that the classification on the most recent evidence falls short of full credibility, the actuary applies
his controls as it were in depth and not, as in the other approach, in breadth. For
example, any Virginia classification showing aggregate expected serious (death and
permanent disability) losses equal to 50 times the average serious award in the
state is regarded as perfectly autonomous. As aggregate expected losses for the
experience period fall below this standard the pure premium indicated for the individual classification for this period is weighted less and less, with compensating
increases in the weight attached to the pure premium now being charged this same
classification. That is, instead of matching the experience of non-autonomous classifications in Virginia with that for the same classification outside the state, this
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method matches Virginia loss costs indicated on the latest data with Virginia currently charged loss costs. The assumption underlying this decision-a judgment
factor-is that it is sounder to avoid the inequity inherent in the combination of
multi-state experience than the instability and inadequacy that may result from insufficient local exposure

5

The following exhibit will illustrate application of the National Council credibility formula to Classification 2014 (Milling of Grain). Because they represent
quite different loss-producing factors and over time may develop different trends,
the compensation pure premium was computed in 3 parts: for serious, non-serious,
and medical losses:
PuRE

PREMIUM DATA,

VIRGINIA CLASSIFICATION 2014

Non-Serious

Medical

.29

.27

Total
.58

17

.31

.28

.76

Formula ..................... 17
Selected ...................... 17

.30

.28

.30

.28

.75
.75

Serious
1945-1946 ....................02
Underlying current rate,
at new rate level ...........

The effect of the credibility formula, E 2 = W3, in which E equals the volume
of expected losses in a classification (expressed as a per cent of volume of expected
losses required for full credibility), and W equals a given per cent of credibility, 40,
for example, is to give proportionately less credibility and less weight to the most
recent experience of the classification as the total of its expected losses drops below
the standard for full credibility. In this example serious losses showed no credibility
at all, so the most recent indication (which was very far out of line with the underlying pure premuim) was ignored, and the formula pure premium was the result
of weighting the underlying premium ioo per cent and the 1945-1946 premium zero.
Non-serious losses with a pure premium of .29 showed 40 per cent credibility which
combined with a 6o p r cent weight for the underlying premium of .31 produced a
formula premium of .30. The credibility of current medical premium was 5o per
cent, hence a formula pure premium of .28.
In the interest of rate stability the actuary selected in each case the middle figure
in each pure premium series. Thus, another example of the judgment factor, but
as is typical in the use of judgment in the pure premium technic, the judgment
enters into selection of statistical-actuarial materials and plan, not in making the
rate itself.
Since, unlike the case for those made by the loss ratio method, these rates cover loss

costs only, the actuary next added an allowance for profit (Virginia permits 2Y/ per
cent of final premium) and for expense (40/ per cent of the same base), and a
catastrophe loading (a flat charge of one cent per hundred dollars of payroll charged
every classification alike). The result is the manual rate.
"5 Compare the rationale applied by the New York Insurance Department in testing the credibility of
fire experience. "Where the credibility for 5 years is inadequate we resort to lo and even x5 year
figures and to out-of-state figures. As a last resort we sometimes combine classes [within the state]
to get a broader statistical base." MARmiNEAu, op. cit. supra note 8, at 16.
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Even this highly skeletonized example of the pure premium method makes it
clear that while the principle of the loss ratio method is simple and even crude, that
of the pure premium is complex and relatively precise. But where in application
the loss ratio technic may be complex indeed, as in the fire rate schedules, that of
pure premium is extremely simple. The latter in fact is sometimes under attack
because, as in automobile liability manual rates, the rate reflects only a few lossproducing factors-the most important being territory-and ignores others, for example, the record of the individual driver, that to the laymen would seem to have a
major bearing on loss costs. To criticism of this kind the actuary has several answers.
The strongest perhaps is that in making rates he is bound to emphasize the averages
because the great majority-in number-of the risks for which he is making rates
present little or no individual risk credibility, and the fewer sub-factors he introduces
into the rate structure the more dependable and equitable his pure premiums. He is
on ground all the solider in this position because the superiority of his rate materials
and the objectivity of his technic permit him to analyze and collate his pure premium
data in any number of combinations, and he can give specific objective answers to
hundreds of questions which under the loss ratio technic must remain forever unanswered. The point is here not that the actuary is always right-in the last analysis
this must be a matter of judgment-but that the pure premium approach permits
him to introduce any desired degree of precision and complexity and that he can
show the critics his work at every stage of his computations. In incorporating the
expense allowance in the final rate, for example, he need not, as under the loss ratio
method, apply the allowance as a flat per cent of final premium, but may and does introduce such variations as expense constants and expense loadings scaled inversely by
size of premium.
A collateral answer to the critics on this point is that when the individual risk
can qualify for individual rating, it is sounder and more equitable to take account of
significant inter-risk differences in this way. The fact is that for the great majority
of risks their similarities with other risks are far more important than their differences.
Because the actuary periodically, in compensation and automobile liability annually, recomputes pure premiums, he is again in a strong position when he has to
justify his rates to the Commissioner and the buying public.
The objections to the pure premium technic are essentially the same as those

urged against classified experience, and, like those, come chiefly from the fire insurers. The "statistical approach" is wrong because it does not produce sound, meaning adequate, rates. There is a strong inference too that "statistical rates" are made
by application of exclusively mechanical formulae :26
Past experience is of great value but has definite limitations. Sound rates cannot be made
on the basis of experience alone. Judgment, other statistics [sic] and all other relevant
factors are of equal or of greater importance.
" Vestal Lemmon, quoted Weekly Underwriter, May 28, 1949, p. 357-
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It is implied also that the pure premium rate-maker indulges in unnecessary and
wasteful elaboration: "... . in the end it will lead to unreasonable burdens on the

companies"; and that by forcing uniform rates and covers it will stifle competition.27
On the last two charges it is relevant to cite casualty experience. Casualty liability
forms are highly standard, but the record is clear that standard forms, however
induced (the compensation policy by statute, the automobile by voluntary insurer
agreement), in that field have not produced either a decline in competition or less
service to the insured, and the burdens on the insurers have not been unreasonable
either.
The first of these charges is the most serious. It highlights clearly the fact that
refusal to admit the virtues of "statistical rates" is due essentially to the belief that the
statistical-actuarial materials are defective as indicators of loss costs, and thus that
the major ingredient in the rate must be judgment. To a remarkable extent indeed,
the difference between the loss ratio and pure premium technics is one of the relative
importance of the judgment factor. The loss ratio method, it is fair to say, and
whatever the justification, makes judgment the main test of a proper rate. Judgment is the principal criterion for classifying risks, for fixing schedule debits and
credits, for selecting expected loss ratios, and for setting the general rate level. In
pure premium rate-making the function of judgment is essentially to assist the actuary to select the statistical-actuarial materials and the technical processes he will
apply to them, not to select the rate result. Judgment, that is, is important primarily in setting up the rate-making plan, but once it is adopted the actuary gives
the plan, as it were, its head. Ex-Superintendent Dineen has put the contrast between
the two technics in this way :28
In the casualty business there is general agreement on the elements and factors entering
into a rate revision. Some elements of judgment are necessarily a part of the revision, but
many of the steps are largely mechanical. The reverse has been true in the fire business.
Great stress-and sometimes too much-has been laid on the element of judgment, not
only as to the rate structure itself but as to its components.

IV
STATE RATE REGULATION: STANDARDS,

ISSUES, UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

As other papers in this symposium will show, the function of the state in the
United States is, generally speaking, not to make rates but to see that they are made in
accord with statutory standards of equity, adequacy, and related criteria. (Exceptions are Louisiana, where casualty but not fire rates are made by the state; 20 Texas,
automobile and workmen's compensation rates; 0 and Massachusetts, compulsory
automobile liability rates 3 1) That the intent of the typical state law is not only to
stop far short of rate-making, but, by stating rate standards in extremely broad terms,
" RUSSELL

H.

MAm1-IAS, CASUALTY RATE REGULATORY LAws AND ADMINISTRATION

" DiNEEN, op. ct. supra note xl, at 20-21.
2 LA. GEN. STAT. §§4030.06, 4030.05 (Supp. 1949).
0
' TEAs STAT. tit. 78, arts. 4 682b, 4907 (Supp. 1949).
" ANN. LAWS MASS., C. 175, §xx3B (948).

(1950).
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to make plentiful allowance for every variety of insurer and insurance situation, is
evident from the statement that accompanied the All Industry-Insurance Commis-

sioners Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Rate Bill, now generally the law
throughout the country :3
Principlesof State Regulation of Casualty and Surety Rates
Casualty insurance is constantly changing. It is impossible to anticipate changes which
may become desirable. For this reason it is preferable to establish principles of regulation
within which administrative authority can exercise a broad discretionary power, rather
than to set forth details which, under changed conditions, might stand in the way of
desirable developments in rate-making.
The section of the standard rate regulatory law (hereafter referred to as rate law)
3
on the Making of Rates provides inter alia that?
Due consideration shall be given to past and prospective loss experience within and
outside this state, to catastrophe hazard if any, to a reasonable margin for profit and contingencies, to dividends, savings or unabsorbed premium deposits . . . to past and prospective expenses both countrywide and those specifically applicable to this state, and to
all other relevant factors within and outside this state.
Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.

The Illinois statute for example copies this language verbatim except that, following
the recommendation of the All-Industry Committee (but not of the Insurance Commissioners), it inserts the word underwriting before profit! 4 The California
statute, which covers fire and casualty rates in the same law, also follows the recommended language but expands the omnibus provision at the end to include "all other
factors, including judgment factors, deemed relevant within and outside this state,"
and provides that "in the case of fire insurance rates, consideration may be given to
the experience of the fire insurance business during the most recent 5-year period for
which such experience is available."35
The broad terms of the rate laws leave, it is clear, a large margin of responsibility
to insurers and state regulatory officials. Technically this responsibility for the insurer is not new; it has rather been spelled out in a law. It is important, in view of
the attack by the conservatives on the new rate laws, to keep in mind that for the
most part the laws do nothing more than put into statutory form the requirement of
compliance with standards that every rate-maker should observe without compulsion.
The rate laws do not create the need for sound and equitable rates. They compel

more careful scrutiny by the state of the rate-maker's methods. This does not of
course amount to saying that the new laws will require no change in insurer, or
supervisory, attitudes and policies. If this were so the laws would be useless. The
" Ail-Industry Committee, Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill, Explanatory Memorandum,
October 23, 1946.

" National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill 53

(1946).
"4ILL. STrAT. ANN. tit. 66.il28(3), §456(I)
5

" CAL. INs. CoDa

§W852(b) (Supp. x949).

(Supp. 1947).

(Italics supplied.)
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significance of the imposition of legal sanctions by the rate laws is moreover increased
immeasurably because for the first time in this country rate results will no longer
be judged solely on the record in a few states. They will be judged not only in each
state (in casualty insurance with the exception so far of Idaho) but on the way the
states are able to coordinate their individual laws into an acceptable national plan.
In evaluating the new rate laws, four issues assume major importance. In broad
terms they may be stated as the issues of (i) the rights and obligations of the independent insurer vis-a-vis rate bureau members; (2) the conforming vis-a-vis the
deviating member of the iate bureau; (3) the propriety and amount of an allowance
in the rate structure for underwriting profit; and (4) the proper relation between
insurance rate and size of risk. The first three are related most frequently to the
setting of the general level of rates and in turn of what we have called group or
classification rates; the last, to determination of the rate for the individual risk. All
have to do generally with both the loss and expense elements in the rate, but the
second and fourth are particularly concerned with expense. Under the rate laws
the expense element in the rate must meet the same standards as the loss content.
All these issues require in one way or another examination of the difficult and
delicate distinction between rate standards and rate uniformity. It is natural in the
circumstances, but it does not make for sound conclusions, that the distinction
has too frequently not been made. Indeed, as we have seen, it has been alleged that
rate standards soon or late will result in uniform rates, uniform policy forms, and
even the end of competition. This reasoning ignores the fact that rate standards are
not the same as uniform rates, that the new laws pertain to standards for rates, and
that there are many kinds and degrees of rate standards.
It is a fair generalization that the purpose, and the effect, of the rate laws is not
to achieve uniform rates but, as a condition precedent to application of equity and
adequacy standards, to assure collection and interpretation of rate materials on a
uniform basis for all insurers whether they choose to join a rate bureau or not. The
point is not of basic importance, but it is of some interest to note that there are
segments of the insurance industry itself that by no means accept the inference of
rate law critics that even uniform rates would be either unsound or illegal. The
mutual casualty companies for example take the position that:"
There is nothing inherently wrong in price uniformity itself [citing United States Supreme
Court decisions on the Sherman Act in other fields]. The casualty insurance business is
fundamentally one in which standardization is the rule rather than the exception.... A
substantial degree of uniformity, at least to the loss portion of the rate, is in the public
interest in the casualty insurance business.
The position of the mutuals, as the last sentence suggests, is not unrelated to their
competitive advantage, but it is a sound one. Uniform rates, it should be noted, in
this connection refer to initial rates, that is, rates before policyholder dividends if
'o SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION, AMERICAN MUTUAL ALLIANCE, MEMORANDUM ON STATE RtGuLATION OF CASUALTY INSURANcE RATES 4r-44 (November 1947).
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any. State rate laws in fact, as we shall see presently, permit variation by the individual insurer from uniform rates both in advance of the period of coverage and at

the end.
It would be nalve of course to suggest that imposition of standards on so vital a

part of the insurance transaction will have no repercussions on other parts of the
insurance transaction, and these repercussions, immediate and potential, must be
kept in mind if the rate laws are to achieve their purpose. The complexity and
pervasiveness of the rate process are admitted; the underlying assumption of these
laws is that it is better to regulate, as it were, from the center of the insurance transaction outward rather than from the circumference toward the center. It is a sound
one.

A. Independent-Bureau Member
The independent insurer-he who chooses not to join with others in maintaining
joint facilities for collecting rate information and making rates, as well as for other
inter-insurer functions-has long been a power, particularly in the casualty business.
To the spur of the independent and to the open or implicit threat of the more independent-minded bureau members to resign when bureau agreements and policies
seem restrictive, must be credited most new ideas (good or bad) in casualty insurance.
The independent has been far less important in fire insurance. The new rate laws"7
in a dozen ways, some general, some specific, make it plain that their purpose is not
to discourage the independent insurer. Independent insurers, for example, are permitted to make their own rate filings, and no insurer is required to join a rate
organization.38 At the same time, a rate bureau must permit any insurer the right
to subscribe to its rate-making services, and members and subscribers may adopt
individual systems of expense allocation. This last in particular is an extremely
potent safeguard of the independent position, since cost competition in fire and
casualty insurance centers on differences in insurer expense of operation rather than
on loss costs.
The reactions of the independents to the new laws must be judged against the
background of the important fact that in the majority of states these laws represent
their first experience with rate regulation. Some independents are not assured
that the laws protect their managerial rights and responsibilities adequately. "Government, acting through the medium of state insurance commissioners, has no right
to dictate the detailed price structure of insurance companies."3 In principle there
is likely to be no disagreement on this statement, but in interpreting it everything
depends on the content one gives the key words, dictate and detailed. The same
question of the meaning of words arises in the demand of the same author that
"in the following discussion specific citations to the All-Industry-Insurance Commissioners Bill
and related documents and to state laws are omitted. The interested reader may refer to the sources
cited notes 29-35 supra.

" Workmen's Compensation is sometimes an exception, as in Pennsylvania, where every insurer,
including the State Workmen's Compensation Insurance Fund, must join the rate bureau. All the
bureau members still retain the privilege of asking for deviation.
" MATMsS,

op. cit. supra note 27.
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a commissioner shall not attempt to substitute his judgment for that of man-

agement nor attempt to require management to prove to the nth degree by statistics
that the price is correct." The conclusion that "it is sufficient if the price is not excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory" is hardly helpful since it is precisely
the function of the commissioner to determine whether a given rate or rate structure
meets these standards, and it cannot be assumed that the independent insurer will,
unregulated, apply them any more than the unregulated insurer rate bureau. One
test of a proper rate suggested by the independents is that of "a mutually acceptable
price" to insurer and insured. But this, untempered by general standards, might be
only another name for rate-making for purely competitive ends. It is that kind of
rate-making that inter alia the new laws are intended to make impossible.
It would seem that the requirement that the independent meet the same rate
standards as those imposed on rate bureaus will add handicaps to non-bureau companies, particularly small ones. But if size gives operating advantages in insurance
it is not the purpose of the rate laws to redress the balance in favor of the smaller
insurers. To make this an objective of the rate laws would be to create a new
inequity and a new restriction on competition. Existing independents by no means
are all small, but in the future it will undoubtedly be more difficult for new companies to start in the insurance business without joining rate bureaus.
B. Conforming-Deviating Bureau Member
Even for insurers joining a rate bureau the rate laws permit opportunity for
deviation from uniform rates. A deviation is a uniform percentage decrease or increase on the rate filed on all or a class of insured risks. In fact all deviations are
minus; plus deviations exist only in the statute because practically when an insurer
cannot do business at bureau rates it goes out of business. A deviation is to be
distinguished both from a filing by an independent and from changes in and supplements to a filing by a rate bureau.
The grounds for approving deviation, under state regulation of course, are the
same as those for permitting insurers to make rates independently: it encourages price
competition and thus works in the direction of greater rate equity. The rate laws,
following the New York precedent, permit approval of deviation for credible differences between the applicant insurer and the rest of the bureau members either in
pure premium or expenses. But, again following New York, they contemplate
that most deviations will be permitted for the latter and not the former, because variations of individual insurer loss costs from the average are very much less credible
than variations in expense; over the latter the insurer has an important degree of
control, over the former relatively little. When the pure premium element in the
rate is based on the combined experience of bureau members, an insurer will ordinarily find it difficult to show an appreciable difference between its loss costs and
average loss costs entering into the bureau rate. In New York, "each company is
presumed to have its share of good and bad risks,"4 ° which would suggest that
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insurers showing better than average loss ratios would be permitted minus deviations, but it has been Department policy to approve deviations only when " ... the
established level of the rating organization does not sufficiently reflect the combined

loss experience of all authorized companies."41 Deviations for loss variations,
that is, are restricted to those cases where the bureau rate is excessive, not in comparison with individual insurer experience but with the loss experience of all
companies combined.

If rates are properly made, there will never be justification

for a deviation for this reason, which in the future will be far less likely to occur than
in the past. The position of the New York Department, with full knowledge of
the consistent ability of individual insurers to do a better job of underwriting than
the average, is not entirely logical, but it is a fault on the side of conservatism. The
decision is no doubt influenced by the fact that the mutuals, the carriers more likely
to 'produce credible loss variations, have at their command other ways to correct
for excessive rates.
C. Underwriting Profit Allowance
A usual provision of the rate laws is that consideration shall be given to "a reasonable margin for profit and contingencies," sometimes with the word underwriting
inserted before profit. The provision does not of course furnish a guarantee that
individual insurers or all insurers combined will be able to show a profit; its
purpose, as its combination with a contingency rate allowance suggests, is to provide
a safety factor. The argument for such a loading by one insurer official that since
"... the more hazardous risks have in the past been under-rated ... it would appear
reasonable to load an additional profit margin on the more stable risks, such as
dwellings,"42 is one scarcely to be expected in these latter days. This is to purchase
over-all rate adequacy at the price of overcharges on selected risk classes, a practice
which it is the announced objective of the rate laws to prevent.
The underwriting profit issue is of pressing importance in fire, not in casualty
insurance. An allowance in the casualty rate for underwriting profit-2A per cent
in casualty excluding compensation-has been allowed for years by the New York
Department. Following a recommendation of the National Council on Compensation Insurance, a factor of "1/2 per cent is now included in every state in which the
Council either makes or advises on rates; 43 in the 1949 New York workmen's compensation rate revision the factor approved was i/2 per cent. In approving a
profit factor the NAIC committee recommended that investment earnings be considered as an offset, but compensation and other casualty rates in fact have been
made without taking these into account, at least in any direct way. But allowed or
not, and on whatever terms, the question has never been the burning issue it is in
fire insurance.
dl STATE OF NEW YoRx, INSURANCE DEPARTIENT, MEmoRANDUm
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d2 D. J. Cowie, quoted Weekly Underwriter, Sept. 3, 1949, p. 538.

"'NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COmpENSATION INSURAN cE, ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1949).
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The reasons are two: the impact of the new fire rate laws that for the first time
made it necessary for insurer or bureau to justify rates by twentieth century standards,4" and the belief of the business that sound rates require a margin of safety wider
than for most other insurances and that unless this margin is provided the safety
of the fire insurance contract will be impaired.
While the main points of dispute over the profit allowance in the fire rate appear
to be over the level to be permitted and the elements to be taken into account in
computing this allowance, on examination the two prove to be essentially the same.
The first question can be settled only after the parties have agreed on answers to the
second; once there is agreement on the elements, agreement on level is not likely to
be long delayed.
Fire insurers and Commissioners have still to agree on these important matters
related to the elements in the profit allowance: should the investment income of the
insurer be charged as an offset to the profit allowance; if so, what is the appropriate
index of such income; to what extent should computation of the insurer's profit be
influenced by adjustment for the effect of the failure of insurer records to make allowance for prepaid expense? 4"
On the first of these the fire insurance business takes the position,4" reiterating
the guarantees it was granted by the Commissioners' 1921 formula, that the investment and underwriting operations of fire insurance are completely separate and that
the first cannot be considered in making rates. The industry is particularly critical
of the recommendation in the McCullough Report in favor of determining the
amount of investment income to be set off against the profit allowance as the excess
of total investment income (including that from reserves) of fire insurers over what
they would earn-assuming the same yield as in their investment portfolios-on their
equity capital alone. Earnings of fire insurers over that of other investors with
similar investment portfolios but not combining underwriting with investment
McCullough considered to be an approximation of the amount of investment income
resulting from the underwriting process, and thus to belong to the insured and not
the insurer. The doctrine or the dogma of the inviolacy of fire insurance investment
"' While the pioneer Kansas rate law applied to fire insurance and included standards of reasonableness, adequacy and non-discrimination, most fire rate laws included only the last of these standards and
did not include the all-important requirement that rates be filed and approved by a supervisory official.
In these last requirements is the distinctive and vital feature of the modern rate regulatory law.
"Materials on which the following discussion is based are: SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE OF TIE FIRE
AND MARINE COMMITrEE, NATIONAL AssocIATioN OF INSURANCE COMISSIONER; SECOND REPORT REUNDERWRITING PROFIT OR Loss ETC. (McCuLLOUGH REPORT) (OCroBER 9, 1947); SPECIAL SuBcommI"rE
ON UNDERWRITING PROFIT OR Loss, FIRE AND MARINE CoMrIrrEE, NAIC, STATEMENT (JUNE 9, 1948);
COMMITTEE ON LAws, NATIONAL BOARD OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS, REPORT (JUNE 3, 1949); and related

official documents.
" Compare the situation in workmen's compensation insurance where since December 1948 it has
been agreed that a profit factor be incorporated in the rate formula, "but that the factor used should
be demonstrated for each state by factual data to be such that it'will produce only a just and reasonable
return on invested capital and surplus devoted to workmen's compensation business, with due consideration being given to any special conditions of individual states and to investment earnings." Roeber,
Bests Insurance News, Fire and Casualty Edition, April 1949, P. 29, quoting the report of the Workmen's Compensation Committee of the NAIC, December 1948.
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income is extended here to the transparent argument of the companies that reserves
are taken from surplus and therefore are the property of the stockholders.
The industry likewise disagrees with the McCullough recommendation that
underwriting expense figures be adjusted to reflect the difference between paid and
incurred expense. In general it rests its case on its legal position under the Commissioners' standard profit formula of i92i, which approved a 5 per cent profit (and
a 3 per cent conflagration) allowance, but against which the companies in New
York have actually earned for the 25-year period ending 1945 a statutory underwriting
profit of only .017 per cent.47 McCullough, observing that in New York "the fire
insurance business has been able to prosper through the 25 years on a statutory
underwriting profit of less than 2 per cent" concluded that the 1921 formula was
excessive. The industry countered by pointing out that between 1939 and 1949
policyholders' surplus of fire companies in the United States declined from 150 to 70
per cent s
In conclusion McCullough suggested that a return of 6 per cent, computed by
comparing combined underwriting and investment income, adjusted for prepaid
expenses, with equity capital invested in the insurance business, should be considered
adequate.
The issues are not yet resolved. So tangled are the questions of law and so
meager the pertinent facts that in its 1949 Report the Special Subcommittee of NAIC,
of which Superintendent Dineen was chairman, chose to recommend continuance of
the status quo and further study. The following quotations are from this Report:
On the issue of investment income:
The subcommittee is .

.

. agreed that it would be impracticable at this time to attempt

to incorporate a direct recognition of investment income attributable to underwriting in
the mechanics of the fire insurance rating process.

While the subcommittee accepted the insurer contention and the rule of law that
reserve funds are owned by the insurer, it, not too logically, recommended study of
a series of questions that suggest that part at least of investment income may in fact
derive from the underwriting function. The qualifier, underwriting,had been included in the profit provision of some state rate laws with the objective of precluding
consideration of investment income in making rates, but the committee concluded
that so far no oneknows what the effect of this revised language may be.
On the issue of correcting insurer expense data to put them on an incurred basis
for rate-making the subcommittee concluded, in a remarkable piece of circular
reasoning, that:
Since such an asset account would be inadmissible in an insurance statement, it is the
determination of the committee that no such adjustment should be made for annual

statement purposes.
7 MCuLLoUcH REPoRT, op. cit. supra, note 45, at 52-53, 50. Statutory underwriting profit is without
adjustment for the premium reserve equity resulting from failure of the insurer's system of accounts to
allow for prepaid expenses.
"D. J. CowiE, Weekly Underwriter, October 1, 1949, P. 809.
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On the amount of the profit allowance, the committee recommended that the
5 per cent of the i921 formula be continued, plus one per cent for catastrophes, with
a proviso that, to encourage stability, rates should not be revised unless they fall
outside the 4 to 8 per cent range, or two per cent on either side of the maximum of
6.
D. Insurance Rate and Size of Risk
This issue, though under somewhat different guise, is of importance both in fire
and casualty insurance. In the former, however, as with so many other regulatory
issues, it has come only very recently to Commissioner and public attention, and
appears to have generated that much more heat for the delay. In fire insurance
the question of the relation of rate to risk size occurs principally in setting the rate
for the individual risk large in the sense that it covers multiple locations. (The
actuary defines individual risk as the combined exposures, wherever they are, of a
single insured.) Large risks in casualty insurance are not only of this variety but
also very typically are large exposures in a single location. The incidence of administrative cost will not be the same for these two kinds of large risks.
The factor of risk size may reflect itself in loss costs, in expenses of the insurer,
or both. In general and for all lines, inverse correlation between risk size and insurer administrative expense is obviously much more likely than between risk size
and pure premium. This is because some insurer expenses, for example, home
office and policy-writing, are of the nature of overhead cost, which, as the risk increases in size, work out as decreasing proportions of total premium. Expense reductions due to this cause are much less likely in multiple than in single-location
risks. By the same token, administrative costs, however small the risk, will not
fall below a certain absolute figure. Since increase of exposures as such, unless related
to superior management as in workmen's compensation, will have no necessary relation to the insured's loss record, and since except in workmen's compensation data
on this point are lacking, the size factor as far as the loss element in the rate goes is
very undeveloped.
The casualty rate-maker, on evidence of varying degrees of credibility, recognizes
differences in cost by risk size in different ways: in manual rates by minimum premiums and expense constants; in individual risk rating by premium discount and
various kinds of retrospective experience rating plans. The last kind of plan likewise takes into account the loss record of the individual risk, but its most debated
feature--one shared with premium discount plans-is its scaling of commission
rates downward with increasing total premium. Retrospective Rating Plan D,
newest of retrospective plans, also permits combination of compensation and liability
risks for individual risk rating, and both premium discount and retrospective plans
are applied to multi-state locations. Insurer and Commissioner committees are at
work in compensation insurance to develop more and more refined data on the
factor of risk size, and a special subcommittee of NAIC recommends that "the pro-
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'
cedure encompass other lines of insurance as well as workmen's compensation."
Casualty rates also quite generally take into account the factor of risk size in
determining the allowance in the rate for losses: in manual rates through the loss

constant (it is well established that in the same classification smaller risks tend to
have poorer experience); in individual risk rates through prospective and retrospective experience rating. The common feature of the last two plans is their emphasis,
much greater in retrospective plans, on the loss costs of the individual risk. Both experience rating plans likewise are generally of multi-state application. Such application would have come even sooner had it not been for the great disparity of state
regulatory standards prior to Public Law i5; and indeed it has been argued that unless rate-making technics and state standards are reasonably uniform the loopholes
that will result or be deliberately created by this disparity will lead to the early collapse

of state regulation.
The fire insurance business, only now beginning to attack the risk size issue in a
serious way, has hunches and opinions on the subject but few facts. On the expense
side, the New York Fire Rating Organization, for example, reported in 1943 that
while average annual residence fire premium in New York is in the neighborhood of
$5, "the cost of writing a policy and placing it on the books is somewhere between $2
and $4, excluding commissions and other expense factors."' This is suggestive but
data of this sort are hardly suitable to support a rate filing under the new laws;
there is even less statistical evidence to light up the current controversy over the
proper way to rate multi-state, multi-location risks.
In 1927 fire insurers through the Eastern Underwriters Association developed
their first plan for rating multi-state contents risks, particularly chain store, and
created Interstate Underwriters Board to operate it. The function of IUB was to be
advisory only, and the extent of rate-making to be performed by IUB was to "gather
from state rating organizations the local rates," from which IUB was to compute "an
accurate average rate .. . based upon the correct local tariffs as published by the
rating bodies in the states where the property is located."'" IUB, still in an advisory
capacity, was to apply to this average rate a percentage reduction or addition to reflect
the characteristics of the individual risk not measured in the average rate. "This
factor is based on judgment. The elements apparently entering into it are experience of the class, competition, size of account [total premium?], number of locations
and experience of the risk." The rating plan, that is, was intended to reflect both
loss and expense variations of the risk from the average in a rather unusual combination of group and prospective experience rating. In reporting on its examination
of UB, the New York Department concluded that while it might be feasible to
work out a sound procedure for combining these, IBU had made no effort to do so.
Such attack would "call for actuarial treatment which has been unheard of in the
"NATioNAL

COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANcE,

ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1948)-

" DINEEN, ep. at. supra note ii, at 9, quoting brief filed with the New York Department by NYFRO.
"'STATE OF NEw YORK, INSURANCE DEPARTMENr, REPORT ON EXAMINATION OF THE INTERSTATE

UNDERwRITERS BOARD ETC. 2, 3, 32, 57 (Oct. 22, 1941).
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fire insurance business." Superintendent Dineen concluded that "in actual practice
the rate was determined competitively following consultations between the broker,
the company and IUB."52 Somewhere also in its history IUB had dropped its advisory function, and "it actually made rates." Small wonder, then, that entirely
apart from its other faults as a rate plan, IBU throws so little light on the risk size
question.
Current discussion on the relation between fire rate and risk size revolves about
the pros and cons of the Escott Plan, approved in 1949 by the New York Department after a brief interlude during which multi-risk rates were made exclusively as
an average of specific location rates, with no debits or credits as under IUB. (IUB
had been abandoned because NAIC would not approve it as an advisory rate bureau.) The principal feature of the Escott Plan is its provision for adjustment of
average specific location rates by the amount that combined loss and loss expense
departs from a permitted loss ratio of 55 per cent."3 This permitted loss ratio, 7/2
per cent higher than for fire insurance generally in New York, is intended roughly to
reflect a presumably lower level of expense for multiple than for single location risks.
As a result of the loss ratio approach, by which rates for multi-location risks will
continue to be made, the Plan by this feature combines an indeterminate degree of
autonomy for individual risk loss experience with a reduced but indeterminate flat
expense loading; on this point compare the simplicity of operation and the certainty
of results were the pure premium method applied as in casualty prospective experience rating. Despite a complete absence of data to support the Plan, the New York
Department approved it, pending further study by the New York Fire Insurance
Rating Organization, the New York Department, and NAIC.
The fire insurance business, to say the least, is not unanimously in back of the
Escott Plan. The dissenters include some of the largest and most powerful carriers.
It is typical of the lack of reliable information on the subject that part of the opposition claims that the Plan discriminates unfairly against the small policyholder because large risk reporting-form business costs as much to handle as small. In this
respect much is expected of the results of New York Department Regulation 30,
which since January i, 1949 has prescribed standards of uniform expense accounting
in fire and casualty insurance.
V

Conclusion
The goals of the rate-maker are few and, stated in general language, simple and
universally accepted. As for God, country, and motherhood, who could be against
them? The effect of even the most elementary study of the rate-making process,
52
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however, is to show how difficult it is to translate these goals into specific plans
capable of commanding general support. The fault is not of the rate-maker. It
is a condition inherent in his job and in the legal, economic, and human circumstances
in which he is asked to perform it.
Some of the limits on the effectiveness of the rate-making process, we have seen,
lie in the nature of the rate itself. As long, for example, as rates for most risks are
made of historical data and for exposures so slight they require combination with
other exposures, so long will it be necessary to accept the actuary's results for precisely
what they are-broad averages. One corollary of this is that rate adequacy must come
before rate equity. Other limits, to be discussed in detail in other papers in this
symposium, are inherent in the American tradition of private insurance enterprise
combined with public regulation. We have in insurance matters, generally speaking, chosen the middle way: between the extremes of laissez-faire typified by the
traditional British position on insurance and of a state monopoly typified by conservative fears of the trend of events in Britain today. This tradition is a compro-

mise, and like all compromise, represents a more or less satisfactory and stable balance of forces; but given the American temperament, likely to be tipped toward
the enterprise and not the regulatory side of the formula. Or at least so it has been.
Much of the opposition in fire insurance ranks to rate regulation indeed is not
against specific laws but against the idea of any regulation at all. The record of
American rate regulation is not fairly read except against this background of the
American temperament. This social limit on the effectiveness of the rate regulatory
process is joined intimately with and strengthened by the constitutional limits inherent in the American system of federated states, and is indeed only another aspect
of the ancient American tradition against government controls and, above all, a
central government. This indeed is the central dilemma posed by the basic assumption of Public Law 15: that a business, if ever there was one, that must be transacted
over state and national lines, can be effectively regulated through a congeries of state
jurisdictions constitutionally, and often actually, independent. Insurer officials have
predicted, indeed, that unless the multi-state risk problem is properly and fairly
promptly solved by the states, federal regulation is inevitable. 4
In the immediate present, a fourth limit on the effectiveness of the rate-making
process is imposed by the inability of the average state to provide personnel and
other facilities required for sound results." Luckily in this respect, even if it might
prefer to do so, it is not feasible for an insurer to conduct its business, including ratemaking, in one way in New York and in a completely different way in all the other
states; these other states, as the reader of this paper will suspect, have been thesometimes unwilling-beneficiaries of New York's leadership. One suspects that
"' Cf. James M. Cahill, Eastern Underwriter, December 17, 1948, p. 83.
" This, in combination with the second limit above, explains the overwhelming preference in state
rate laws for the subsequent-approval vis-a-vis the prior-approval variety.
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even without the lifting power of the Appleton Rule, New York will continue to

lead and instruct her sister states, an accident of insurance history for which the
strong states' rights proponent should give the most fervent thanks. This last
will in any case in time disappear. In the not-so-long-run, our record of state
regulation will be conditioned primarily by the extent to which the insurance
busmess-particularly fire-is able to accustom itself to the new relation between
insurer and state, and by the ingenuity and the willingness of the states to work
out mutually acceptable and socially sound methods of achieving their common objective.

